ESET Analysis
ESET researchers have noticed a brand new phishing marketing campaign concentrating on customers of the Zimbra Collaboration e mail server.
17 Aug 2023
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5 min. learn

ESET researchers have uncovered a mass-spreading phishing marketing campaign, geared toward accumulating Zimbra account customers’ credentials, energetic since no less than April 2023 and nonetheless ongoing. Zimbra Collaboration is an open-core collaborative software program platform, a well-liked different to enterprise e mail options. The marketing campaign is mass-spreading; its targets are a wide range of small and medium companies and governmental entities.
In keeping with ESET telemetry, the best variety of targets are situated in Poland, adopted by Ecuador and Italy. Goal organizations differ: adversaries don’t deal with any particular vertical with the one factor connecting victims being that they’re utilizing Zimbra. Up to now, we’ve not attributed this marketing campaign to any identified menace actors.

Determine 1. Nations hit by the marketing campaign, in line with ESET telemetry
Initially, the goal receives an e mail with a phishing web page within the connected HTML file. As proven in Determine 2, Determine 3 and Determine 4, the e-mail warns the goal about an e mail server replace, account deactivation, or comparable concern and directs the person to click on on the connected file. The adversary additionally spoofs the From: discipline of the e-mail to look like an e mail server administrator.

Determine 2. Lure e mail warning in Polish about deactivation of the goal’s Zimbra account

Determine 3. Machine translation of lure e mail, initially in Polish

Determine 4. Lure e mail in Italian; which means is identical as in Determine 3
After opening the attachment, the person is offered with a faux Zimbra login web page custom-made in line with the focused group, as proven in Determine 5. The HTML file is opened within the sufferer’s browser, which could trick the sufferer into believing they have been directed to the official login web page, though the URL factors to an area file path. Notice that the Username discipline is prefilled within the login type, which makes it seem extra official.

In Determine 6 we’re offering an instance of official Zimbra webmail login web page for the comparability.

Within the background, the submitted credentials are collected from the HTML type and despatched by HTTPS POST request to a server managed by the adversary (Determine 7). The POST request vacation spot URLs use the next sample: https://<SERVER_ADDRESS>/wp-admin/ZimbraNew.php

Determine 7. Code snippet liable for the POST request exfiltrating targets’ credentials
Apparently, on a number of events we noticed subsequent waves of phishing emails despatched from Zimbra accounts of beforehand focused, official firms, resembling donotreply[redacted]@[redacted].com. It’s seemingly that the attackers have been in a position to compromise the sufferer’s administrator accounts and created new mailboxes that have been then used to ship phishing emails to different targets. One clarification is that the adversary depends on password reuse by the administrator focused by means of phishing – i.e., utilizing the identical credentials for each e mail and administration. From accessible information we’re not in a position to verify this speculation.
The marketing campaign noticed by ESET depends solely on social engineering and person interplay; nevertheless, this may increasingly not all the time be the case. In a earlier marketing campaign described by Proofpoint in March 2023, the APT group Winter Vivern (aka TA473) had been exploiting the CVE-2022-27926 vulnerability, concentrating on webmail portals of navy, authorities, and diplomatic entities of European international locations. In one other instance, reported by Volexity in February 2022, a gaggle named TEMP_Heretic exfiltrated emails of European authorities and media organizations by abusing one other vulnerability (CVE-2022-24682) within the Calendar function in Zimbra Collaboration. In the newest point out, EclecticIQ researchers analyzed a marketing campaign just like the one described in our blogpost. The primary distinction is that the HTML hyperlink resulting in the faux Zimbra login web page is situated instantly within the e mail physique.
Conclusion
Regardless of this marketing campaign not being so technically subtle, it’s nonetheless in a position to unfold and efficiently compromise organizations that use Zimbra Collaboration, which stays a lovely goal for adversaries. Adversaries leverage the truth that HTML attachments comprise official code, and the one telltale ingredient is a hyperlink pointing to the malicious host. This manner, it’s a lot simpler to bypass reputation-based antispam insurance policies, in comparison with phishing strategies the place a malicious hyperlink is instantly positioned within the e mail physique. The recognition of Zimbra Collaboration amongst organizations anticipated to have decrease IT budgets ensures that it stays a lovely goal for adversaries.
For any inquiries about our analysis revealed on WeLiveSecurity, please contact us at threatintel@eset.com.
ESET Analysis affords personal APT intelligence stories and information feeds. For any inquiries about this service, go to the ESET Menace Intelligence web page.
IOCs
ESET detection names
HTML/Phishing.Gen
Information
We’re unable to share file IoCs as a result of samples comprise delicate data.
Community
Hosts used to exfiltrate harvested credentials are hosted on shared servers. Detections based mostly solely on IP addresses may result in false positives.
IP |
Area |
Internet hosting supplier |
First seen |
Particulars |
145.14.144[.]174 |
fmaildd.000webhostapp[.]com |
Hostinger Worldwide Ltd, NL |
2019-12-31 |
Malicious host used to exfiltrate harvested credentials. |
145.14.145[.]248 |
nmailddt.000webhostapp[.]com |
Hostinger Worldwide Ltd, NL |
2019-12-31 |
Malicious host used to exfiltrate harvested credentials. |
145.14.145[.]122 |
tmaxd.000webhostapp[.]com |
Hostinger Worldwide Ltd, NL |
2019-12-31 |
Malicious host used to exfiltrate harvested credentials. |
145.14.144[.]58 |
posderd.000webhostapp[.]com |
Hostinger Worldwide Ltd, NL |
2019-12-31 |
Malicious host used to exfiltrate harvested credentials. |
145.14.145[.]94 |
ridddtd.000webhostapp[.]com |
Hostinger Worldwide Ltd, NL |
2019-12-31 |
Malicious host used to exfiltrate harvested credentials. |
145.14.145[.]36 |
mtatdd.000webhostapp[.]com |
Hostinger Worldwide Ltd, NL |
2019-12-31 |
Malicious host used to exfiltrate harvested credentials. |
173.44.236[.]125 |
zimbra.y2kportfolio[.]com |
Eonix Company, US |
2022-05-27 |
Malicious host used to exfiltrate harvested credentials. |
URLs
https://fmaildd.000webhostapp[.]com/wp-admin/ZimbraNew.php
https://mtatdd.000webhostapp[.]com/wp-admin/ZimbraNew.php
https://nmailddt.000webhostapp[.]com/wp-admin/ZimbraNew.php
https://posderd.000webhostapp[.]com/wp-admin/ZimbraNew.php
https://ridddtd.000webhostapp[.]com/wp-admin/ZimbraNew.php
https://tmaxd.000webhostapp[.]com/wp-admin/ZimbraNew.php
https://zimbra.y2kportfolio[.]com/wp/wp-admin/ZimbraNew.php
MITRE ATT&CK
This desk was constructed utilizing model 13 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
Tactic |
ID |
Title |
Description |
Useful resource Growth |
Compromise Accounts: E mail Accounts |
The adversary used beforehand compromised e mail accounts for marketing campaign spreading. |
|
Set up Accounts: E mail Accounts |
The adversary created new e mail accounts to facilitate the marketing campaign. |
||
Preliminary Entry |
Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment |
The marketing campaign was unfold by malicious HTML information in e mail attachments. |
|
Execution |
Consumer Execution: Malicious File |
A profitable assault depends on the sufferer clicking on a malicious file within the attachment. |
|
Persistence |
Create Account |
The adversary created new e mail accounts on compromised Zimbra situations for additional spreading of the phishing marketing campaign. |
|
Assortment |
Enter Seize: Net Portal Seize |
The adversary captured credentials inserted to a faux login web page. |
|
Exfiltration |
Exfiltration Over Various Protocol: Exfiltration Over Uneven Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
The adversary exfiltrated passwords by POST requests despatched over the HTTPS protocol. |